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ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT ECONOMIC TESTIMONY
ON FUTURE INFLATIONARY TRENDS
Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1975)
Plaintiff's husband was killed by a falling steel plate while assem-
bling a massive steel sculpture. Plaintiff brought a diversity action un-
der Minnesota's Wrongful Death Statute,' and a jury rendered a verdict
for plaintiff in the amount of $505,092.2 Defendant appealed, claim-
ing that the admission of expert economic testimony about the impact
of future inflation" resulted in an excessive verdict.' The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's liability, but re-
manded the damages question5 and held: Minnesota law excludes ex-
1. MnIN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (1971).
2. The special jury verdict exculpated Serra, the designer, and Weidlinger Engi-
neering, the developer of the construction plans. The jury found defendants Milgo In-
dustrial, Inc., the steel fabricator, and Milgo Art(s) Systems, its broker (hereinafter re-
ferred to jointly as Milgo) 85 percent culpable for negligently fabricating the sculpture,
and third party defendant Pratt's Express Company (Pratt's), decedent's employer, 15
percent culpable for failing to follow the Weidlinger assembly plans. The total judg-
ment was assessed against Milgo, since Pratt's had previously settled a workmen's
compensation claim in connection with the accident. Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d
1289, 1291, 1297-98 (8th Cir. 1975).
3. Dr. Edward M. Foster, Associate Professor of Economics at the University of
Minnesota, testified that the average yearly interest on "safe" investments such as U.S.
Treasury Bonds had been 4.1 percent since 1947. The average annual wage increase
for decedent's union had been 5.6 percent during that same period. Dr. Foster testi-
fied that the 1.5 percent differential would remain fairly constant. At the time of trial,
Treasury Bonds were yielding 6.5 percent per year, while Teamsters' wages were in-
creasing by 8 percent. From Johnson's estimated 1971 gross income of $18,516 over
a work-life expectancy of 28 years, Dr. Foster deducted 15 percent for taxes and found
a total loss of earnings of $546,597. He then reduced this figure by 12 percent for
Johnson's estimated personal consumption and arrived at a net future loss of $481,005.
Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289, 1293 n.5 (8th Cir. 1975).
4. Milgo also contended on appeal that it should not be held liable because Pratt's
negligent failure to follow the assembly instructions was a superseding cause of the in-
jury or, alternatively, that it should receive contribution from Pratt's. Brief for Appel-
lants at 1I, 19, Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1975). The judgments against
Milgo on liability and in favor of Pratt's on contribution were affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit. Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289, 1292, 1297 (8th Cir. 1975).
5. The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and gave the district court the option
of holding a new trial on damages or remitting the excess of the jury award. Johnson
v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975). The district court eventually exercised
the latter option, entering a remittitur that reduced plaintiff's award to $390,000. Tele-
phone interview with John E. Castor, Attorney for Appellant, Dec. 5, 1975.
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pert testimony on future inflationary trends except for general predic-
tions that wage gains are highly probable.0
The primary objective of tort compensation is "repairing plaintiff's
injury or making him whole."'7  Since loss of earnings is susceptible
to monetary valuation, it is the most justifiable element of compensa-
tion8 from a strictly economic point of view. Determining the amount
of lost future earnings is complicated, however, by the need to reduce
the award to a single, presently payable lump sum. In most cases this
payment is discounted to present worth'10 to reflect the earning capacity
of the money in hand." Courts usually employ discounting methods
postulating an economy with stable or declining prices. 12  Thus, rapid
or sustained inflation will severely diminish the purchasing power of
plaintiff's award, leaving him undercompensated.1' In addition, lower
6. Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289, 1297 (8th Cir. 1975).
7. 2 F. HAPmER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1301 (1956) [herein-
after cited as HARPER & JAMES]; C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 137 (1935).
8. R. HENDERSON & J. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 146 (1975).
9. Fetter v. Beale, 1 Ld. Raym. 339, 692, 91 Eng. Rep. 11, 1122 (1699, 1702);
C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERALS ON TORTS 409 (2d ed. 1969); 2 HAR-
PER & JAMES § 25.2; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES § 13 (1935);
cf. Slater v. Mexican Nat'1 R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
10. The federal courts and the courts of twenty-one states specifically require reduc-
tion to present worth. For citations of cases by jurisdiction, see S. SPEISER, RECOVERY
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 8:11 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as SPEISER].
11. In Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916), the Supreme Court
stated:
So far as the verdict is based upon the deprivation of future benefits, it will
afford more than compensation if it be made up by aggregating the benefits
without taking account of the earning power of the money that is presently to
be awarded. It is self-evident that a given sum of money is worth more than
the like sum payable in the future.
id. at 489.
12. See Henderson, The Consideration of Increased Productivity and the Discount-
ing of Future Earnings to Present Value, 20 S. DAKOTA L. REv. 307, 309 (1975):
When future prices are expected to decline, or remain constant, there can
be no economic disagreement with the theory of discounting as required in
[Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v.] Kelly [241 U.S. 485 (1916)]. The economic lag
of judicial practice occurs, however, when courts continue to apply the ration-
ale of 1916 to the economic realities of the 1970's. In addition, the error is
raised to a still higher level when appellate courts refuse to permit the trier
of facts to consider the probability that in the future wages and prices will rise.
The claim that this assumption is speculative hardly rises to the dignity of an
argument, when consideration is given to the fact that discounting itself is spec-
ulative, because it assumes prices will remain constant or possibly decline,
13. The rate of inflation need not be dramatic to erode the plaintiff's damage
award:
It does not take galloping inflation of 6% or more a year to drastically shrink
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federal courts have virtually ignored the distinct phenomenon of wage
growth, which is a function not only of inflation but of increased eco-
nomic productivity. 14  In Grunenthal v. Long Island Railroad,'5 how-
ever, the Supreme Court upheld a damage award based upon projec-
tions of increased wage growth, without mention of inflation, in an
opinion neither understood nor followed by lower federal courts.1
The presentation of evidence on future inflation raises several prob-
lems. First, since predicting economic trends is a matter of opinion,
the value of the damage award to the injured party. Assuming an annual de-
crease in purchasing power of only 3% a damage award given to a twenty year
old permanently disabled plaintiff will, by his sixty-fifth birthday, will [sic]
be reduced by 75% in real purchasing power. A 3% increase in the cost of
living for twenty years, would shrink a $100,000.00 award down to $54,000.00
in value.
Note, Future Inflation and the Undercompensated Plaintiff, 4 LOYOLA U.L.J. 359, 360
(1973) (footnotes omitted). It has been argued, therefore, that the refusal to consider
future inflation results in unequal treatment of the parties:
As a matter of logic, fairness and justice, if in estimating pecuniary loss, the
defendant in a death case gets the benefits of reduction to present value of fu-
ture increments, then plaintiff should receive as an offsetting benefit, consid-
eration of shrinkage from future inflation in the purchasing power of the dol-
lars awarded for the future.
SPEiSER § 8:9, at 728 (emphasis original).
14. Note, Loss of Future Earnings: Present Worth v. Wage Growth, 35 MoNT.
L. REV. 354, 358 (1974), quoting Henderson, The New Economics and the Law of
Damages in EXPERTS IN LITIGATION 105, 106 (1973):
In general, productivity and inflation are two primary causes for the increase
in money earnings. Of the average annual increase in the hourly compensa-
tion of 5.4 per cent between 1946 and 1971, approximately 2.2 per cent results
from increases in productivity and 3.2 per cent results from inflation.
15. 393 U.S. 156 (1968). In Grunenthal, an injury case arising under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA). the Supreme Court reinstated a $150,000 award by
the trial court because plaintiff had presented
convincing testimony not refuted . . . demonstrating the steady wage increases
in recent time for work equivalent to that rendered by plaintiff, and the strong
likelihood that similar increases would continue.
Id. at 160. Since Grunenthal arose under the FELA, its relevance to an action arising
under Minnesota law is limited. Nonetheless, if wage growth is admissible evidence
in federal courts which have uniformly frowned upon proof of inflation, it should surely
be admitted in states like Minnesota in which state law is ambiguous. See notes 35 &
37 infra.
16. See Henderson v. S.C. Loveland Co., 396 F. Supp. 658, 660 (N.D. Fla. 1975):
mhe court [in Grunentha] approved an award of $150,000 for loss of future
wages in light of convincing testimony not refuted demonstrating steady wage
increases in recent time for work equivalent to that rendered by plaintiff and
the strong likelihood that similar increases would continue. While not clear
from the decision, that evidence may not have been tied to inflation ...
[Johnson v.] Penrod [Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc)]
and the other recent Fifth Circuit decisions, though neither mentioning nor dis-
tinguishing GrunenthaI, come several years after it. Without undertaking
further to reconcile these decisions, if they need reconciliation, this court is
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the witness must qualify as an expert for his testimony to be admitted.17
Expert testimony is admissible only if the witness' special knowledge
will aid the trier of fact.' 8 Yet, while courts acknowledge that eco-
nomic expertise is helpful in assessing some pecuniary losses,' 9 many
consider inflation a concept so familiar to the layman that expert testi-
mony is unnecessary 20 and therefore inadmissible. Second, expert
constrained to follow, and will follow, the categorical statement of these recent
decisions of [sic) Fifth Circuit that the effect of future inflation is not to be
considered ....
17. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 69 (2d ed. 1972).
18. Id. § 13. McCormick adds as a separate requirement that the subject matter
must be "beyond the ken!' of the average layman. Id. This view has apparently been re-
jected in the federal courts under the new Federal Rules of Evidence. The Advisory
Committee describes the test of rule 702, whether the expert's specialized knowledge
"will assist the trier of fact," as "broadly phrased," necessitating a "common sense in-
quiry." F-D. R. Evie. 702, Advisory Committee Note. Rule 702 reflects prior practice
in the federal courts. Compare Chicago Great W. Ry. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394, 400
(8th Cir. 1945), with Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Harvey Fund-Raising Manage-
ment, Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 642 (8th Cir. 1975).
19. See, e.g., Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967)
(monetary value of services of deceased housewife and mother); Sheets v. Bowen, 318
F. Supp. 640 (D. Del. 1970) (estimated average savings of deceased); Merrill v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (future pecuniary loss from death
of mother); Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 402 P.2d 979 (1965) (probable future
earnings of student); Turrieta v. Wyche, 54 N.M. 4, 212 P.2d 1041 (1949) (same).
An economist may be the only expert competent to present evidence of future infla-
tion. See cases cited in notes 27 & 31 infra. An actuary may be of limited assistance
in introducing mortality tables and calculations of present worth. Cf. Levin v. Trans
World Air Lines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Pa. 1962). But see Wetherbee v. Elgin,
J. & E. Ry., 191 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951). An actuary's testimony on future inflation
has been held inadmissible. Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464 F.2d 294 (3d Cir.
1972).
20. For this reason, juries may consider, even without economic testimony, the
"present low purchasing value of money and high cost of living." Johnson v. Serra, 521
F.2d 1289, 1295 (8th Cir. 1975), citing inter alia, Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170,
178, 19 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1945). While similar references to inflation are legion, these
statements are so general that it is difficult to ascertain whether the jury may consider
inflation only from the time of the injury to the time of trial, the probability of future
inflation, or both. See, e.g., Tullos v. Corley, 337 F.2d 884, 887 (6th Cir. 1964); South-
ern Pac. Co. v. Zehnle, 163 F.2d 453, 454 (9th Cir. 1947); Alabam Freight Lines v.
Thevenot, 68 Ariz. 260, 262, 204 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1949); State v. Daley, 153 Ind. App.
330, 337, 287 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1972); Moteberg v. Johnson, 297 Minn. 28, 34, 210
N.W.2d 27, 31 (1973); Kerzie v. Rodine, 216 Minn. 44, 48, 11 N.W.2d 771, 773
(1943); Johnson Testers v. Rangel, 435 S.W.2d 927, 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Texas
Consol. Transp. Co. v. Eubanks, 340 S.W.2d 830, 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). Some
courts limit consideration of inflation to its ascertainable impact in the period between
the injury and the trial. See, e.g., Normand v. Thomas Theatre Corp., 349 Mich. 50, 84
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N.W.2d 451 (1957). In Armentrout v. Virginia Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D.W.
Va. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948), the court stated:
It may be argued that ordinary fluctuations in the purchasing power of money
may not properly be considered by a jury in awarding damages. Perhaps not,
as to the future; but the jury have the right, and it is their duty, to be realistic.
They need not close their eyes to the economic facts of life.
Some juries have been allowed to speculate upon the likelihood of continued inflation.
See Willmore v. Hertz Corp., 437 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1971); Nollenberger v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1963). Cf. Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co.,
502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974):
Inflation is a fact of life within the common experience of all jurors. . . [-f
jurors should be prohibited from applying their common knowledge of inflation
in reaching a verdict, the party entitled to recovery could be grievously under-
compensated.
See akvo Beanland v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 480 F.2d 109, 116-17 (8th Cir. 1973)
(Bright, J., concurring). Contra, Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1975) (en banc):
[W]e still cannot so surely discern the shadow of inflation as a coming event
as to warrant requiring its inclusion in a present rule for calculating future
damages. . . . Then, too, if future inflation does cause higher wages, experi-
ence predictably demonstrates that higher interest rates on investments which
have always accompanied inflation will also occur and this factor will mitigate
the failure to include an inflationary surcharge in wage rate calculations.
Id. at 236. Accord, Robertson v. Douglas Steamship Co., 510 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1975);
Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970). Even when juries consider
future inflation, however, courts have disagreed on the propriety of explicit instruction
by the court. See Willmore v. Hertz Corp., 437 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1971) (allow-
ing jury instruction to consider future inflation); cf. Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co.,
502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974). Contra, Murphy v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc.,
444 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1971); Segebart v. Gregory, 160 Neb. 64, 69 N.W.2d
315 (1955); Hodkinson v. Parker, 70 S.D. 272, 16 N.W.2d 924 (1944).
Courts may take judicial notice of past inflation either as an initial factfinding mat-
ter, see Edwards v. Sims, 294 So. 2d 611 (La. Ct. App. 1974); DeWitt v. Schuhbauer,
287 Minn. 278, 177 N.W.2d 790 (1970), or upon review of the excessiveness of a ver-
dict. See Frasier v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 244 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1957);
Vaughn v. Southern Bakeries Co., 247 F. Supp. 782 (D.S.C. 1965); Hord v. National
Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1952); Mize v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
46 Cal. App. 3d 436, 120 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1975); Richey v. Service Dry Cleaners, 28
So. 2d 284 (La. Ct. App. 1946); Bergstrom v. Frank, 213 Minn. 9, 4 N.W.2d 620
(1942); Mudd v. Quinn, 462 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1971); Woodford v. Illinois Cent.
G.R.R., 518 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Scofield v. J.W. Jones Constr. Co., 64
N.M. 319, 328 P.2d 389 (1958); Melanson v. Turner, 436 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968); Henwood v. Moore, 203 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Borzea v. Anselmi,
71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796 (1952). Some courts also presume that the acknowledged
inflationary trend will continue. See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp.
1271 (D. Conn. 1974), af'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 524 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.
1975), noted in 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 138 (1976); Curry v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219
(N.D. Cal. 1971); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971);
Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1968); Weadock v. Eagle Indem.
Co., 15 So. 2d 132 (La. Ct. App. 1943).
For an example of the error caused by speculation based on economic facts within
the purview of judicial notice, see Calihan v. Yellow Cab Co., 125 Cal. App. 649, 13
Vol. 1976:135]
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testimony on future inflation must also be relevant,21 a determination
made by the court under the law creating the substantive cause of ac-
tion. 22 Federal courts adjudicating federal claims23 have found eco-
nomic prediction of inflationary trends too speculative to be admiss-
ible.2 4 In a diversity action, however, the relevance of testimony is
governed by applicable state law,25 so that federal courts admit expert
testimony when the state court would do so.26 When state law is si-
P.2d 931 (1932), where the defendant urged the court to consider that the purchasing
power of the dollar had increased and the court responded:
Changing conditions should be noted by the court. While it may be proper
for defendant to point to the increased purchasing power of plaintiff's dollar,
defendant's actual complaint is the scarcity of money. Our judicial knowledge
having been invoked, we note signs of the country's gradual emergence from
the depths of the depression; we may expect a return to normal conditions.
Id. at 651, 13 P.2d at 932.
21. Relevance in this context is a question of law rather than of logic. Evidence
may be irrelevant either "because it is not probative of the proposition at which it is
directed, or because that proposition is not provable in the case." C. McCoRMIcK,
HANDBooK OF THE LAW OF Ev-mmioc § 185 (2d ed. 1972), quoting James, Relevancy,
Probability and the Law, 29 CAXr. L. Rv. 689, 691 (1941). Testimony on future in-
flation is irrelevant when, because of the law giving rise to the particular action, it is
not provable.
22. "Mhe proper measure of damages is inseparably connected with the right of
action." Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 491 (1916). See also Johnson
v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289, 1294 (8th Cir. 1975); Willmore v. Hertz Corp., 437 F.2d 357,
360 (6th Cir. 1971).
23. Most typically involved are claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA), 45 U.S.C. H§ 51-60 (1970), and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
24. See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975) (cn
bane) (Jones Act case); Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir.
1974) (FELA death case); cf. Sleeman v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.
1969) (FELA injury case).
25. Willmore v. Hertz Corp., 437 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1971); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Zehnle, 163 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1947); Kowtko v. Delaware & H.R.R., 131 F. Supp. 95
(M.D. Pa. 1955); 1A J. MooRs, FEDERAL PRAcrcE § 0.310, at 3403 n.17 (2d ed.
1974). But see Haddigan v. Harkins, 441 F.2d 844, 851 (3d Cir. 1970):
[E]xpert testimony as to the value of services presents only an evidentiary
question.... Thus we need not concern ourselves with how a Pennsylvania
court would rule, but can look to federal authorities favoring admissibility.
The state view on damages will also be followed in actions brought under the Federal
Torts Claims Act (FTCA), in which liability is predicated upon the "law of the place
where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
26. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying
Rhode Island law); Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1974)
(interpreting Connecticut law); Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271
(D. Conn. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.
1975); Scruggs v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 320 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Va. 1970); Brooks
v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967); Levin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
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lent on the admissibility of the expert testimony, federal courts presume
disallowance to be the majority rule and reject such testimony.2 7 In
fact, a majority of the relatively few states that have confronted the is-
sue directly2s have admitted the expert economic testimony.2 9
The final issue is the extent to which such testimony is admissible.
This issue has been most closely addressed by the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, which initially excluded entirely testimony on fu-
ture inflation as too speculative.3 0 In Bach v. Penn Central Transpor-
201 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. Pa. 1962). See also United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63
(9th Cir. 1975) (FTCA death claim applying California law).
27, See, e.g., Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975) (inter-
preting Nebraska law); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1972)
(interpreting Pennsylvania law); Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464 F.2d 294 (3d
Cir. 1972) (interpreting Pennsylvania law); cf. Murphy v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc.,
444 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1971) (interpreting Michigan law). See also Frankel v. Heym,
466 F,2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972) (FTCA injury claim interpreting Pennsylvania law); Wil-
liams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970) (FTCA death claim interpreting
Rhode Island law); Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (FTCA
death claim interpreting Florida law).
28. Only one state, Rhode Island, allows by statute testimony on future inflation:
In determining said award evidence shall be admissible concerning economic
trends, including but not limited to projected purchasing power of money, infla-
tion, and projected increase or decrease in the cost of living.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1.1.3 (Supp. 1972).
In Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 183 (1st Cir. 1974), the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit noted that the Rhode Island statute was enacted in "apparent
response" to its decision in Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970),
in which, purporting to apply Rhode Island law, the court excluded testimony on future
inflation. Williams raises serious questions about the wisdom of the prevailing federal
court view that judicial or legislative silence connotes disapproval of expert predictions
of inflation.
29. See, e.g., Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974); Schmitt v. Jenkins,
170 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa 1969); Resner v. Northern Pac. Ry., 161 Mont. 177, 505 P.2d
86 (1973); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 341 A.2d 613 (1975) (adopt-
ing an approach similar to, though not citing, Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d
1117 (6th Cir. 1974)); Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Ore. 666, 513 P.2d
1140 (1973); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 501 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973); cf. Hinzman v. Palmantier, 31 Wash. 2d 327, 501 P.2d 1228 (1972). Contra,
Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 155, 160, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866,
872 (1966) (citing as error the introduction of "amateurish speculation as to continuing
inflation").
In Raines v. New York Cent. R.R., 129 11. App. 2d 294, 263 N.E.2d 895 (1970),
rev'd, 51 Ml1. 2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230 (1972), the Illinois Court of Appeals held that
expert testimony on future inflation was not properly admitted, thus resulting in an ex-
cessive verdict. The Illinois Supreme Court deliberately avoided the issue of admissi-
bility, and reversed because other proper evidence showed the award was not excessive.
51111. 2d at 437, 283 N.E.2d at 235.
30. Sleeman v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969). In Sleeman,
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tation Co.,"- the court modified its position by rejecting a specific pro-
jection of an economist but admitting his opinion that increases "in in-
come or promotions would most probably occur. '3 2  Bach precludes
expert testimony on future inflation but not on the probability of wage
growth based upon other factors such as promotion or productivity
gains. 3
In Johnson v. Serra,3 4 the Eighth Circuit determined that a Minnesota
court would exclude specific expert predictions of future inflation. 5 The
an FELA injury case, the district court reasoned that inflation would offset the present
worth reduction and consequently did not reduce the award to present worth. Id. at
307. The Sixth Circuit noted that the district court's decision lacked evidentiary support
and added:
Nor do we encourage the trial courts of our circuit to explore such speculative
influence on future damages as inflation and deflation.
. ..Mhe inflation versus deflation debate rages inconclusively at the high-
est policy levels of our government, in national electoral campaigns, in learned
economic journals and is exemplified in the daily gyrations of the stock mar-
kets. The debate seems unlikely to be resolved in one personal injury trial.
And if testimonial resolution of this factor bearing on the future is attempted,
the door is opened to similarly speculative and debatable offsets ....
Id. at 308.
Sleeman has been cited for the proposition that testimony about future inflation is
speculative per se. See Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 143-44 (3d Cir.
1973), on remand, 374 F. Supp. 850, 853 (M.D. Pa. 1974). In Willmore v. Hertz
Corp., 437 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1971), the Sixth Circuit characterized this language
as dicta. See also Henderson, Some Recent Decisions on Damages; With Special Ref-
erence to Questions of Inflation and Income Taxes, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 423, 431
(1973):
The Sleeman doctrine is predicated upon the assumption that the increases in
prices and wages of the past three decades are aberrations that will wither
away. Our economic and financial knowledge of the functioning of the econ-
omy tells us that this notion has a probability estimate which approaches zero.
31. 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974). In affirming the trial court's refusal to admit
an economist's projections of decedent's wage growth through the year 2002, the court
stated:
Mhe predictive abilities of economists have not advanced so far that they can
forecast with any certainty the existence and rate of inflation for the next
thirty years. Limited use of economists and other experts may be appropriate
in some cases to show that raises in income or promotions would most prob-
ably occur. [Citation omitted]. Yet testimony of the exact income that the
decedent would have received through the year 2002 is so speculative in our
view, that it is inadmissible.
Id. at 1122.
32. Id.
33. The crux of Bach is disallowance of testimony on the exact income that dece-
dent would have received rather than a more generalized exposition of the economic
factors involved. Id.
34. 521 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1975).
35. Id. at 1296. Minnesota law is silent on the admissibility of future inflation tes-
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defendant in Johnson argued that such testimony was too speculative
and its admission led to an excessive verdict.36  The court agreed,37
observing that "economists have fared only slightly better than fortune
tellers and soothsayers in foretelling the future."' s  The court did not
dispute the expert's opinion that decedent's wages would have in-
creased at a rate 1.5 percent per year greater than the return that the
damage award would earn if "safely" invested. The ultimate question
for the court was the "reasonableness" '39 of the award to plaintiff,
since it found the jury had accepted the expert's analysis "without test-
ing the reasonableness of its mathematically derived result."40
timony, alluding only in general terms to the right of the factfinder to consider decreased
purchasing power. See Minnesota cases cited in note 20 supra.
36. Brief for Appellant at 18, Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1975).
37. 521 F.2d at 1297. Johnson was the second occasion for the Eighth Circuit to
consider admission of evidence on future inflation. Two members of the Johnson panel,
Justice Clark (sitting by designation) and Judge Lay, had discussed the question in Riha
v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975), a personal injury case arising
under Nebraska law. While both Minnesota and Nebraska allow juries to consider infla-
tion in general terms, see Moteberg v. Johnson, 297 Minn. 28, 210 N.W.2d 27 (1973);
Johnson v. Schrepf, 154 Neb. 317, 47 N.W.2d 853 (1951), Nebraska disapproves of jury
instructions on inflation. See Segebart v. Gregory, 160 Neb. 64, 69 N.W.2d 315 (1955).
Minnesota has not decided that issue. See notes 20 & 35 infra.
38. 521 F.2d at 1294. But cf. Henderson, supra note 12, at 311:
Given the economic environment. . . over the last several decades, it does
not appear to be very speculative to assume that in the future the earning ca-
pacity of the vast majority of individuals will rise. Any science, whether of
the natural or social variety, is based upon estimating the probability of events.
* , . In economics, as in the study of any aspect of human behavior, the
rank order of probability and the corresponding confidence limits are of a dif-
ferent magnitude than those found in the more exact sciences. But this quali-
tative divergence should not lead to the conclusion that in the social arena the
possibility and probability of an event are of equal weight. Estimates of the
probability of economic occurrence are grounded in the economic reality and
base from which such projections are made ....
39. 521 F.2d at 1294.
40. Id. at 1293. The court was impressed with the seemingly preposterous fact that
although decedent's gross salary would have been $18,516 in 1974, plaintiff would, ac-
cording to defendant's "undisputed calculations," receive $32,831 from an award of
$482,000 in the first year alone. During the 28-year actuarial period, plaintiff would
receive over $1,500,500 with a final payment of $125,724 in 2002, the last year. The
source of these "undisputed calculations" was an arbitrary and unsupported assumption
of an interest rate of 6.5 percent and a wage increase of 8 percent, the most current and
inflationary figures. Brief for Appellants at 19-20, Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289 (8th
Cir. 1975). The expert testimony only proved, however, an average annual differential
of 1.5 percent between wage increases and "safe" interest rates, at no time predicting
a continuation of current inflation rates. Appendix to Brief for Appellant, Vol. H at
755-93, quoting Transcript of Record at 749-88. This observation indicates the danger
that courts and juries alike will blindly accept mathematical formulae without regard
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Relying heavily on the Sixth Circuit's treatment of the problem, the
Johnson court endorsed the Bach rationale, and determined that admis-
sion of the expert's analysis, but not his computations, would accurately
reflect the Minnesota view.41  The Johnson holding may have been in-
appropriate to the exact issue presented by the case; the trial record
suggests that plaintiff's expert did not testify about future inflation.42
His analysis projected wage growth in decedent's industry based on past
labor statistics but did not focus upon the economy as a whole. Infla-
tion is an important, but not exclusive, element of wage growth. 3 Since
to the reasonableness of the end result. Minnesota courts have been sensitive to the
problem of undue influence of expert testimony upon the jury. See, e.g., Sorenson v.
Cargill, Inc., 281 Minn. 480, 163 N.W.2d 59 (1968); Hallada v. Great N. Ry., 244
Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 874 (1955).
41. The court's reliance on Bach may be unwarranted since Bach properly applied
federal law to the federally created FELA right at issue in that case.. Compare Sleeman
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969), with Willmore v. Hertz Corp.,
437 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1971). ("[Alppellants' reliance upon this court's decision in
[Sleeman] with reference to future fluctuation in purchasing power is misplaced since
we were there concerned with a federally created cause of action."). 437 F.2d at 360.
See also note 30 supra. The Johnson court's approach, though not its reliance on Bach,
may be justified by Minnesota's distrust of expert testimony. See cases cited at note
40 supra.
42. Before Dr. Foster took the stand, the following colloquy took place between
the trial judge and plaintiff's attorney:
THE COURT: [Ms he going to suggest a wage growth based on a historical
pattern of 5% percent, is he also going to talk about continued inflationary
process?
MR. HVASS: No, Your Honor.
Appendix to Brief for Appellants, Vol. II at 737-38, quoting Transcript of Record at
730-31.
The following exchange took place during cross-examination:
Q. Did your calculations consider a continuing rise in inflation?
A. No.
Q. They did not?
A. Well, the calculations were as defined by Mr. Hvass.
Q. But you assumed a continuing rise in his wages, then, did you not?
A. Yes.
Id. at 770-71, quoting Transcript of Record at 764-65.
43. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. The courts' tendency to use the
terms "earnings increase factor" and "economic trends" interchangeably has resulted in
confusion. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 853 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
The issues would be presented at trial differently: future inflationary trends would be
projected on the basis of changes in the national economy as reflected in the Consumer
Price Index, while wage growth would be projected through changes in the hourly wages
of laborers in a given industry.
The question arises whether a projection of wage growth is any less speculative than
a projection of future inflationary trends. Perhaps so, since wage growth is at least par-
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Bach dealt with future inflation rather than wage growth, the Johnson
court's reliance upon that decision is misplaced. Furthermore, when
the issue is properly viewed as wage growth rather than inflation, the
Johnson holding may conflict with Grunenthal."1 Assuming, however,
that the Johnson court accurately characterized the issue to implicate
future inflation, the decision is still questionable.45 Projecting future
economic loss is inherently speculative; future inflation is no more
speculative than other damage elements on which the courts admit ex-
pert testimony.1
tially a function of increased productivity, and it is highly probable that long-term in-
creases in productivity will continue in the future since a "long-term negative or zero
rate of productivity could exist only under conditions in which science, technology and
the level of human skill failed to advance." Leonard, Future Economic Value in Wrong-
ful Death Litigation, 30 OHio ST. LJ. 502, 507 (1969). Whether the widespread reali-
zation that insatiable consumer demand may exhaust our finite resources requires a less
optimistic appraisal of the economic future is beyond the scope of this Comment.
44. Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968). See notes 15-16 supra
and accompany ing text.
45. [Wlnflation is undeniably a controversial topic but the controversy centers
not on the issue of whether the price level will rise but on the rate of increase
of prices ....
Note, supra note 14, at 358 n.32, quoting Henderson, The New Economics and the Law
of Damages in EXPEuTS IN LITIGATION 105, 113 (1973) (emphases original). See also
SPEIstR § 8:11, at 527:
We may expect to hear the objection that such evidence is speculative. It
is submitted that it is the very opposite of speculation; for without any evidence
as to future wages and price levels a jury would be forced to speculate not only
as to what the future earnings of deceased would have been but also as to how
much they would buy ....
(emphasis original).
46. It has been argued that evidence about future inflation might open up a myriad
of collateral and remote considerations. In Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d
840 (8th Cir. 1975), the court noted:
Proof as to possible income tax, future inflation, attorney fees and cost of
litigation are all generally held inadmissible. Yet it cannot be denied that all
of these elements relate directly or indirectly to the computation of an injured
party's actual loss. Once the door is opened to one contingency, it is necessary
to consider as well all other factors which might affect actual loss. The pri-
mary reason for their exclusion is that they are not in a manageable form of
proof
Id. at 844 n.4. Cf. Sleeman v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969);
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
870 (1960). But see Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Ore. 666, 677, 513 P.2d
1140, 1146 (1973):
In our opinion, however, it is no more speculative to assume that wage rates
for plaintiff's employment will continue to increase at 5% per year. . . than
it is to assume that the interest discount rate will remain stationary during the
same . . . period.
See also Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Schnebly v. Baker,
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A court has several options in determining the scope and admissibil-
ity of an expert's prediction of inflation. It can (1) allow economic
experts to present projections, subject to careful jury instruction con-
cerning their probative value;4 7 (2) allow the jury to consider future
inflation based on its own knowledge or on general information sup-
plied by an economist within the Bach limits;48 (3) discard the re-
quirement that judgments be reduced to present worth;40 or, (4) shift
217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974).
47. For the practical problems of expert economic advice in an adversary context,
see Pyun, The Role of Economist's Testimony in Perspective-An Economist's View, 39
INS. CouNsEL J. 361, 362-63 (1972):
[The economist's basic task in the valuation process . . . involves a consid-
erable amount of highly enlightened guesswork .... [H]is conclusion ...
is necessarily a tentative one at best. However, . . . the tentative aspects of
the economist's opinion on his projection are frequently underplayed in the
midst of the dynamic verbatism of courtroom communication. The economist
is likely to present his testimony . . . in a detached and convincing manner
with a considerable air of authority and completeness ...
As the trial proceeds, what began as the unbiased professional testimony by
an economist frequently deteriorates to a somewhat contrary experience ...
Irrespective of the accuracy and thoroughness of the work done in arriving at
his projection, the economist must . . . defend the pertinence as well as the
relevance of his projection during cross examination by the defense attorney.
Often, as the unfriendly defense lawyer prods and excoriates the content of
the economist's testimony, the task of defending his testimony becomes quite
strenuous.
One court, however, wondered how the introduction of such testimony could make the
jury's conclusion about the probability of wage increase any less valid than it would
be without such testimony. Resner v. Northern Pacific Ry., 161 Mont. 177, 505 P.2d
86 (1973); cf. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1945). See, e.g., Johnson v.
Serra, 521 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1975); Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840
(8th Cir. 1975); Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Corp., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974);
Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 341 A.2d 613 (1975).
48. The limits of the Bach rule refer to the court's unwillingness to accept precise
computations of damages set forth by economic analysis. See note 33 supra. But see
SPEiSER § 8:11, at 741:
It is easy to say that a slavish statistical exactitude is not to be sought. On
the other hand, in measuring damages. . . we must strive to be accurate. Any
tools that will aid us in this regard should not be ignored. The jurors are not
expected to appreciate all the intricacies of economic theory. But they live
with inflation every day of the year, and are well able to grasp the basic con-
cepts involved. We do not want merely a reasonable approximation of plain-
tiff's loss-we want as accurate an approximation of that loss as possiblel
49. The Supreme Court of Alaska has adopted this approach. Beaulieu v. Elliot,
434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967). There are two good reasons for eliminating the present
worth rule: 1) it ignores the rate of wage growth and risks undercompensation, and
2) the jury's burden of determining damages will be considerably lightened. See Note,
supra note 14, at 361. For offsets similar to Beaulieu, see Pierce v. New York Cent.
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the emphasis of the controversy to methods of computing present worth
that provide an "inflation-proof" discount rate.50 By choosing the sec-
ond alternative, the Johnson court failed to provide satisfactory guid-
ance either to attorneys seeking to introduce expert testimony or to
juries who must consider the impact of inflationary economic trends.
It is difficult to understand how testimony that "raises in income...
would most probably occur"' will reduce speculation in the fact-find-
ing process. Unless economic forecasts rest upon no valid factual basis,
the first and fourth alternatives provide important data to the jury with
which it can more effectively undertake its task of making the plaintiff
whole. The third alternative, discarding the present worth rule, incor-
porates a rough, uneducated sense of justice which may work to de-
fendant's detriment,5 2 but at least simplifies damage questions at trial.
The Bach rule, as adopted by the Johnson court, promotes none of
these objectives and will continue to confound plaintiffs' attorneys who
try to inject the issues of wage growth or future inflation into the trial.
R.R., 304 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Mich. 1969) (5 percent wage growth rate offset 5 percent
discount); Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967) (court added 15 per-
cent to total damage award); Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. Mich.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960
(1969) (5 percent wage growth rate offset 5 percent discount rate); Nollenberger v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (1 percent inflation rate
offset against 4 percent discount rate). See also Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059
(3d Cir. 1974) (court applied 2% percent inflation factor to future medical expenses
rather than lost future earnings).
50. See Feldman v. Allegheny Air Lines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1294-95 (D.
Conn. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975)
where the court found
loin the basis of the evidence and judicial notice of the continuing erratically
inflationary behavior of the American economy, that 1.5 per cent per year is
an appropriate figure by which to discount an award of damages based on the
destruction of future earning capacity when that award has itself been com-
puted without consideration of inflation ....
51. Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974).
52. Particularly when runaway inflation is an omnipresent issue in the news media,
the jury may tend to overestimate its long-term impact, thus penalizing the defendant.
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